chapter, I argue that this regulatory 'assemblage' does not amount to a fully integrated or harmonious regulatory regime. There are numerous tensions, discussions and contradictions at work in the ways in which international regulation and practices play out in this domain.
A key tension concerns the role and authority of banks and financial institutions themselves:
as discussed in this chapter, banks have acquired substantial discretionary power to develop their own risk assessments and judgements concerning the transactions they deem suspicious. Questions have been raised about the fairness and effectiveness of authorizing or 'deputising' private sector institutions to make security decisions. 8 Studies note that measures of success in regulatory compliance are poorly defined and that investments may be disproportionate to cost. 9 Other tensions in this regulatory domain revolve around the privacy of financial clients, the unduly stringent regulation of the non-profit sector, and the recent trend of 'derisking,' whereby entire client groups become expelled from the financial sector. than actual present suspects) fits into a wider 'politics of preemption,' that seeks to identify and disrupt the potential future threats.
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The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the regulatory assemblage and main tensions relating to CTF in the post-9/11 era. The chapter starts with a discussion of the security logics of CTF after 2001. Although there are important regulatory precursors prior to 9/11, I will argue that CTF efforts in the most recent fifteen years distinguish themselves through a number of elements that set them apart from the longer tradition of anti-money laundering (AML). Second, the chapter gives an overview of the complex regulatory landscape of CTF in the transatlantic context. I argue that this is best understood as a regulatory assemblage where (policy) goals are not always clearly aligned, and where a number of important tensions and contradictions are at play. The third section of the chapter develops a more specific focus on banking practice, as a key but often overlooked site where CTF is given shape and meaning.
CTF After 9/11
Before 9/11, few policy turns looked less likely than an embrace of substantial new financial regulation by the US government. Only months before the 9/11 attacks, Phil Gramm, FATF is uniquely positioned to take up the challenge of terrorist financing. Our goal must be nothing less than the disruption and elimination of the financial frameworks that support terrorism and its abhorrent acts.
14 How did this U-turn come about? How was it possible that, as Ibrahim Warde put it, "those very people who were intent on dismantling the anti-money laundering legislative apparatus found themselves hastily and vigorously expanding it" after 9/11?
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This section unpacks the security logic underpinning post-9/11 CTF. The purpose here is not to suggest that the field of CTF is fully coherent and logical; indeed, the next sections will elaborate on its gaps and fault lines. However, there are a number of elements that render post-9/11 CTF unique and quite different from the tradition of AML as it had developed since the 1970s. 16 These elements add up to a particular logic of security, or what
Foucault calls a 'dispositif,' understood as "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions -in short, the said as much as the unsaid" 17 There is not enough space in this chapter to sketch all elements of the 'heterogeneous' CTF ensemble. This section unpacks two core elements of the CTF dispositif, in an attempt to explain its significance and centrality within the broader context of preemptive security politics after 9/11.
18
First, the pursuit of terrorism financing as a crime is best understood as closely related to the politics of preemption. This represents a break with earlier money laundering regulation: if undermining crime and amassing evidence were the objectives of pre-9/11 money laundering policy, predicting possible terrorist attacks by studying 'clean' money trails became the objective after 9/11. 19 In his address to the nation on 9/11, President Bush financing is acknowledged to be a "low probability event" with a "particularly fragile connection to statistical technology." 34 However, this acknowledgement functions as a continuous spur to action, alertness and flexibility in suspicious transactions monitoring. As
Pat O'Malley shows, uncertainty is never just a threat to be subdued or eradicated, but simultaneously fosters entrepreneurial creativity and transformative power: 
CTF Regulation as Complex Assemblage
This section examines the transnational institutional innovations produced in the name of fighting terrorism financing. I argue that the pursuit of terrorist monies amounts not strictly to a regime of global governance, but is better understood as an assemblage, in which mundane transactions, donations and affiliations are securitised in novel ways. In this context, Colin King and Clive Walker speak of a "fragmented" policy order. 36 Similarly, an assemblage is understood as "heterogeneous…political formation," that is mobile, emergent and dispersed -but that nevertheless excises considerable power in the name of its strategic functionality. 37 An assemblage exercises power at multiple sites and through diverse elements, that work in conjunction but may also encounter friction. 38 The agency of assemblages, according to Jane Bennett, is the "distinctive efficacy of a working whole" made up of "technological, cultural and atmospheric elements." Understanding the complex and fragmented landscape of CTF regulation in terms of an assemblage has three advantages. First, the assemblage distinguishes itself from the social structure or regulatory regime, both of which suggest a much greater degree of coherence, direction and purposeful effectiveness. 40 Conceptually, the term helps explain how the interplay of a heterogeneity of elements, including, for example "regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures…[and] moral and philanthropic propositions," enables a certain strategic functionality and outcome. 41 This interplay may at times lead to relatively stable formations and "well-ordered coherent wholes." 42 However, such stability and order can never be assumed or taken for granted, but needs to be itself explained. Studying the assemblage does not just focus on the coherence and autonomy of governing machines, but is attentive to their internal gaps, tensions and contradictions. The assemblage recognises friction and unpredictability, and its consequences are conceived as an "unstable cascade"
rather than a certain outcome. 43 Such attention to gaps and contradictions is essential for understanding the politics of the pursuit of terrorist monies -if politics are to be understood as the contestation over the constitution of the social order and the circumscription of the domain of the political.
Third, an assemblage approach theorises power not so much in terms of effectiveness, but in term of reach. 45 It steers away from notions of clear hierarchies and levels, in order to foster an understanding of how, in Allen's words "actors … make their leverage and presence felt through certain practices of proximity and reach." 46 This understanding steers analysis away from conventional questions of US hegemony within CTF (though those remain important), but seeks to grasp more precisely how particular agencies, networks and alliances come to exercise power trans-jurisdictionally. As Allen explains, this shifts focus away from the "shape and size of an actor's capabilities" toward an analysis of the work involved "to hold authority in place despite being stretched globally or the kind of relationships that enable domination to be exercised … at a distance." Taken together, the institutional innovations discussed in this section amount to a complex assemblage of transnational governing rather than a coherent regulatory regime. As we have seen, for Bennett an assemblage is a mobile, multidirectional whole that produces partly unpredictable outcomes. In the finance-security assemblage, some political authorities 
Banks in the Frontline
As discussed in the previous section, one of the advantages of understanding the regulatory landscape of CTF as an assemblage, is that it focuses attention on practice. As Tania ab/normality to the private sector. Within banking practice, CTF requirements become grafted onto prior commercial agendas and incentives. 77 In order to understand how banks and other financial institutions become positioned as security actors, it is important to examine in some detail the 'risk-based' approach to suspicious transactions reporting that has been rolled out across the global regulatory landscape in the wake of 2001. 78 This type of self-regulation is in line with other areas of banking regulation, for example, on capital adequacy. 79 Applied to the sphere of suspicious transactions reporting, the risk-based approach substantially strengthens reporting requirements. However, it simultaneously offers substantial freedom to regulated institutions as to how to implement regulation. Put differently, although banks have seen their obligations to identify and report suspect transactions increase considerably in recent years, they have also acquired more authority and discretion to determine what precisely they consider to be suspicious. The rationale behind this approach is to 'minimise' the burden of regulation, and to direct monitoring resources toward shifting notions of 'highrisk' banking domains. 80 The risk-based approach is thought to ensure that financial institutions remain as flexible, cunning and unpredictable as the terrorists themselves. According to the UK Treasury's white paper on the Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism, "the response to crime and terrorism needs to be as supple as the criminals and terrorists themselves. A prescriptive 'tick-box' approach would miss its target. 81 This logic involves a turn to 'subjective' reporting. When, how and why a transaction can be supposed to be connected to money laundering or terrorist financing has become a matter for reporting institutions to decide. The determination and definition of unusual transaction patterns and suspect client groups rests largely with financial institutions themselves. The risk-based approach thus transfers considerable authority to financial service providers to determine the abnormal, the risky and the suspicious. Generally welcomed as "a useful principle in ensuring that the institutions and professions concerned are not unnecessarily overburdened with [reporting] obligations," 82 this approach simultaneously enables far-reaching (security) decision-making by mid-level financial bureaucrats.
Before examining more precisely what is considered to be suspicious in contemporary banking practice, it is important to draw out two consequences of the riskbased approach. First, under the risk-based approach, banks become engaged in a quest with compliance -and not necessarily the prevention of terrorism -as their objective. Indeed, the regulator accepts that it is not possible to preemptively detect all instances of money laundering or terrorist financing. 83 Accordingly, regulators expect financial institutions to be able to demonstrate that they have taken "adequate" measures to implement "an appropriate and effective control structure to manage identifiable money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Lord Dear: You smell a rat and you report it?
Ms Banks: Yes.
85
What is made clear in this remarkable exchange is the explicit appeal to suspicion and suppleness that is built into the juridical framework of the reporting regime. It authorises private sector employees to report suspicions to government agencies on the basis of 'gut feelings' and 'smelling a rat.' Below, we will examine in more detail not just how the 'rats'
are defined in contemporary banking practice, but also what the turn to subjectivity and suspicion in reporting practice mean for the role of banks as security actors.
Inside Banking Practice
This final section briefly delves into actual banking practice and ffinancial datamining to examine how decisions concerning risk and suspicion are made. It is through the algorithmic patterning and prediction of customer behaviour that banks put into practice the new imperatives of suppleness and fluidity of the risk-based approach. What elements may go into the automated but mobile determination of normality and suspicion as offered by these models? Although compliance practice is continually changing, it is possible to distil a number of axes along which financial datamining operates.
These include: first, a deployment of public and private terrorist watch lists; second, a focus on particular but shifting geographical areas and territories; third and perhaps most importantly, an appeal to economic logic and rationality. Taken together, these elements entail a move from establishing (aberrant) terrorist account profiles, toward a substantial, continuous and mobile modelling of financial normality. Exposed Persons' (PEP) lists. 87 Taken together, public and private watchlists include millions of names and organizations, and are updated daily. 88 Name similarities, transcription problems and the fluidity of lists mean that sophisticated software is required to execute list-checking, and this software frequently offers a risk-based list of possible hits. List checking at least partially operates as a mobile norm whereby a binary hit/no hit system has been replaced with a risk-based scoring system.
A second element going into software-based suspicious transactions mining is the notion of risky locales and territories, including but not limited to countries with a 'reputation' for being tax havens and countries 'supporting' terrorism. For example, the FATF report of 2008 on terrorist financing emphasises the risks of business with "safe havens, failed states and state sponsors," who may "provide support for terrorist organisations," and names "Somalia, Iraq and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border" as risky geographies. 89 The more recent FATF report on ISIL financing shifts geographical focus toward the Syria-Iraq-Turkey border regions. This report entails a complex geographical imagination, whereby notions of suspicion are not reducible to non-compliant territories.
What is significant about the focus on such dispersed risky territories is that it is accompanied by a diminished importance of the FATF non-cooperating countries list (NCCT-list). 90 The demise of the NCCT list, coupled with the simultaneous increase of riskbased geographical suspicious transactions mining, suggests a move away from the overt and relatively transparent FATF procedures, toward a more flexible, obscure and unaccountable process. Put simply, the deployment of geography as marker of suspicion inside the models enables a suppler and shifting notion of risky territories -so that financial clients find it difficult to know which geographical destinations incur heightened scrutiny.
Third, are transactions that, in the words of one interviewee at the British Banking Association, "do not seem to have an economic sense." 91 As the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's guidance on Customer Due Diligence for banks also stipulates:
"Certain types of transactions should alert banks to the possibility that the customer is conducting unusual or suspicious activities. They may include transactions that do not appear to make economic or commercial sense." 92 Indeed, the requirement that transactions make economic sense is written into the legal framework of the risk-based approach. Article 20 of the EU's Third Money Laundering Directive -which harmonises money laundering regulation across the member states -requires scrutiny of "all unusual patterns of transactions" which have "no apparent economic…purpose." 93 These normative and juridical appeals to economic sense or logic enable boundary-producing work in the markets, whereby that which is considered to be economically illogical or irrational comes to be considered as suspicious. 98 There were no allegations of fraud or misuse of the accounts. On the contrary: the companies were considered "model customers of Barclays." 99 However, Barclays decided to exit these relationship because of a "perceived higher level of risk" in the smallscale MSBs sector. 100 The account closures can be understood as preemptive because they were not motivated by past misuse, but to avoid potential future abuse. According to Barclays, the legitimacy of transfers from these accounts to Somalia and Eritrea could not be fully assessed. This became pressing in a context in which anti-terrorism financing requirements oblige banks to report transactions and freeze monies associated with the Somali terrorist network al-Shabaab. In an environment where, as Barclays put it, it is not possible to "spot criminal activity with the degree of confidence required," 101 but where public association with terrorism financing could do very serious damage to a company's reputation and be grounds for hefty OFAC fines, banks apparently deem it better to preemptively exit these risky sectors altogether.
Derisking presents a break with the (claims to) sophisticated data-led modes of risk modelling and client monitoring discussed above and suggest that, in some sectors, banks decide that the business case does not outweigh the cost of compliance. According to Tom
Keatinge, derisking decisions are based on the "unquantifiable risk" of terrorism financing fines, and potential "worst-case scenarios." 102 Derisking shows the extent to which CTF is impacting banking practices, and has negative effects on financial access for particular client
groups. An international debate on derisking was commenced by FATF in 2014, which stated that "De-risking should never be an excuse for a bank to avoid implementing a risk- 
Conclusions
This chapter has unpacked the security logics underlying post-9/11 CTF. CTF distinguishes itself from the tradition of AML in three respects. First, its commitments are largely preemptive, seeking to identify and disrupt potential future terrorist attacks, rather than amassing evidence and confiscating proceeds after the crime. Second, it entails a new focus on small amounts and mundane transactions. Third, its risk-based approach authorizes private financial institutions to enact autonomous security decisions to a novel degree.
The chapter has suggested that CTF constitutes a complex transnational regulatory landscape. This landscape is less like a clear and coherent international regime, and more like an emergent, mobile assemblage. The malleability of this assemblage is illustrated by the fact that, in recent years, the 'foreign fighters problem' of identifying and disrupting travel to Syrian conflict zones has been grafted onto its agenda. Many tensions and contractions remain within this assemblage. Even though suspicious transactions reports have increased substantially in most countries in recent years, typically only 1-5% are thought to be associated with terrorism financing. The effectiveness and proportionality of CTF compliance practices remain questioned, and the profile of the terrorist bank accounts remains elusive. In addition, the societal critique of CTF has grown in recent years, as it disproportionally targets Muslim groups and migrant remittance channels. Despite these critiques, CTF remains a firm policy commitment of many states, and authorities' expectations of the value of financial intelligence in counter-terrorism are only increasing.
Within this broader and contested landscape, the decision of Dutch police to share suspect name lists with financial institutions to preemptively visualize their networks and transactions is a remarkable new step, that illustrates again how CTF is at the forefront of the post-9/11 politics of preemption.
